In this paper we provide a political-economy explanation for the degree of centralization in economic policy making. Our model features a continuum of regional public goods that differ with respect to inter-regional spill-overs. To determine which policies are centralized each region selects a representative who then negotiates centralization and the regional contributions towards the financing of centrally provided public goods. We show that the resulting degree of centralization falls short of what would be optimal for the median voter. This outcome is caused by strategic delegation: representatives who have a low preference for public spending tend to prefer decentralized provision and therefore serve to reduce the region's contributions.
Introduction
Most countries have more than one layer of government. Supra-national entities, such as the European Union, feature federal structures by construction.
One of the most imminent questions arising in this context is how much decision power is allocated to each level of government. In Europe, this issue is known by the name "subsidiarity" and has been one of the most debated topics for years. Economists have contributed their part to this debate by analyzing the costs and benefits of centralization. However, given the high profile of the issue and the political heat surrounding it, hardly anyone expects a purely normative outcome. And indeed, most European summits are mired by stories of shady backroom deals, be it in Nice or elsewhere.
In this paper, we provide a political-economy explanation for the degree of centralization in economic policy making. For concreteness, we focus on the provision of regional public goods which exhibit interregional spill-overs.
Starting from a symmetric, two-country case, we extend the standard model of local public good provision by incorporating an entire continuum of public goods. These differ with respect to the degree of interregional spill-overs.
The difference between the utility from the optimal centrally provided level and from decentralized provision determines a surplus from centralization for each regional public good. This surplus depends positively on the degree of spill-overs and on the individual preference for public spending. Comparing the surplus from centralization with exogenously given utility costs from centralization, a critical degree of spill-overs is identified. Below this threshold, public goods should be provided in decentralized fashion, at least from the perspective of a benevolent utilitarian social planner. Public goods with higher spill-overs, on the other hand, are ideally provided centrally.
The main contribution of our paper lies in going beyond this normative analysis. To determine which policies are taken at the center and which decentrally, we consider a political equilibrium that results from the following process: By majority vote, each region selects a candidate as its representative. These regional representatives then form a federal council or house of representatives. It is this institution which decides on the degree of centralization. When doing so, the representatives also have to negotiate the regional cost shares that determine the funding of centrally provided public goods.
We show that the politically determined degree of centralization falls short of the social optimum even though the latter is preferred by each region's median voter. This discrepancy is due to strategic delegation: Representatives who have a low preference for public spending tend to prefer decentralized provision -because these representatives only see a comparativly small surplus from centralization. This effect serves to reduce the region's cost share negotiated between the two representatives. Knowing this, the median voter in each region strategically delegates the representation of the region to someone who is less keen on public goods in order to pay less contributions.
We then extend the model to asymmetric regions, considering two types of asymmetries: different costs of centralization and different interregional spillovers. With different costs of centralization the degree of strategic delegation remains the same in both regions, and consequently both the representatives have the same preference for public spending. The different utility costs of centralization are offset by different regional financial contributions to the centralized provision of public goods. In the case of different spill-overs between regions voters in both regions elect representatives who different preferences for public spending. We can show this for a limit case of asymmetries where only one of both regions causes spill-overs whereas the externality is negligible in the other direction. Under this scenario, the strategic delegation effect is stronger in the spill-over receiving region whereas it is less of an issue in the region which sends the spill-overs. This result may be of some interest in the context of EU enlargement because of its potential implications for the representatives of the accession countries. If public goods provided by the accession countries are less important for the incumbent countries than the other way round, then our results imply that the representatives of the accession countries are less keen on integration because their constituents hope to achieve a favorable cost sharing arrangement.
How does our paper tie in with the existing literature? There is a strand of work that has analyzed the formation (as well as the break-up) of political unions. An early survey is provided by Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore (1996) and a recent contribution is Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2001) . As our paper Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2001) also analyze the centralization of policymaking, i.e. the scope of a political union, by considering different public goods with different spill-overs. However, their direct democracy approach does not account for strategic delegation with respect to the centralization decision, which is the driving force behind our results.
Since, for concreteness, we concentrate on the provision of regional public goods, we rely on a large body of previous work in this area. To single out one example, Besley and Coate (2003) use a similar political process to the one we consider but apply it to the decision on the provision of a public good whereas we apply it to the decision on the degree of centralization.
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Strategic delegation in Nash-bargaining models of public good provision is analyzed in Segendorff (1998) and Brueckner (2000) . As in our paper, voters delegate decisions to a representative with a lower preference for public spending to improve the region's position in the bargain with other regional representatives. As in Besley and Coate (2003) strategic delegation influences the level of public goods in these papers but not the degree of centralization, which is taken as exogenous.
Another paper that is related is the recent contribution by Redoano and Scharf (2004) . They compare the outcome of a direct referendum on policy centralization with that in a representative democracy, using a model with different policy preferences between jurisdictions. Unlike our model, Redoano and Scharf (2004) only consider a single local public good and the institutional set-up in their model differs from the one in our paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model. In Section 3 we introduce the political process and derive the political equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the case of asymmetric regions, and Section 5 concludes.
The Economic Model
The economic framework underlying our model represents a familiar setup in the context of regional public good provision. There are two regions indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} which, for the time being, are assumed to be perfectly symmetric. Each region is populated by a continuum of citizens and we normalize the mass of each region's population to one. Citizens differ within regions with respect to their personal preference for public spending. This preference is captured by the parameter α which we assume to be distributed uniformly over (α min , α max ). The utility of individual α in region i is then given by
where c i is the consumption of the private good and the g i are continua of local public goods in each region. These public goods are indexed by β, the extent of interregional spill-overs, which is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the unit interval (0, 1).
On the production side, we assume that each citizen earns an exogenous income of y, and that the costs of providing public goods in terms of the private good are equal to one for all public goods. To finance their provision, the government can raise lump-sum taxes.
We now derive, for future reference, the public good levels supplied by a welfare maximizing government under decentralized and, alternatively, under centralized provision. Note that utilitarian welfare maximization corresponds to maximizing the utility of the average citizenᾱ who, due to the assumption of a uniform distribution, also happens to be the median.
Under decentralized provision, the welfare maximizing local governments ignore the utility of citizens in the other region and solely consider the welfare of their own average voter. Let
denote the net benefit of local public good β to citizen α in region i. In other words, this is the utility arising from the particular local public good minus the per capita cost of providing it. Each local government then maximizes b i (g(β);ᾱ) over g i (β) and chooses to provide the following level of the local public good:
We see that the public good level under decentralized provision does not depend on the spillover β to the foreign region, quite simply because these spill-overs are ignored and not internalized.
Under centralized provision, the inter-regional spill-overs are internalized.
Utilitarian welfare maximization together with the symmetry assumption implies that a central authority weighs equally the net benefit accruing to both regions' average citizen. In addition, we assume that centralization entails a fixed utility cost of f per capita. The local public good levels that
We see that under centralized provision, the level of the public good supplied increases not only in the average preference for public spendingᾱ but also in the extent of inter-regional spill-overs β. This is because those spill-overs are now taken into account.
Comparing centralized versus decentralized provision, equations (2) and (3) reveal that the public good levels that are decided locally fall short of the centralized levels. Again, the reason are the inter-regional spill-overs that the central authority internalizes but the local governments do not.
From a normative standpoint, it is straightforward to derive which policies should be decided centrally and which policies decentrally. Let s(β; α) ≡ α[1 + β] ln[1 + β] −ᾱβ − f denote the surplus from centralization. On the one hand, for a public good without any inter-regional spill-over (β = 0) this surplus is negative because the fixed cost dominates the (non-existent)
benefit. On the other hand, for public goods with high spill-overs the surplus is positive as long as the the fixed cost is not too large.
2 The threshold level of spill-over β * that follows from utilitarian welfare maximization is implicitly defined by:
Below this level, the provision of a public good is best decided locally, whereas above this level centralized provision dominates. This is the reference point, to which we want to compare the politically chosen cut-off level. We now turn to its derivation.
Political Economy Equilibrium
Given the highly politicized nature of decisions on the threshold level, one has to doubt whether the normative outcome of section 2 obtains. These doubts are further underlined by the anecdotal evidence surrounding European summits where these decisions are taken. It is more realistic, in our view, to regard the decision on the allocation of decision powers as the outcome of a political process. We now consider such a process that will result in a politically chosen threshold.
The political process we envisage has three stages: On the first stage, citizens in each region choose a representative by majority voting. On the second stage, the elected representatives of both regions decide cooperativly on the set of public goods -or, more generally, policy areas -that are to be decided centrally. On the third stage, the quantities of local public goods are chosen by the respective policy makers at the center or in each region.
We solve this game backwards. First, we consider the decision on how much of each local public good to provide. Second, we analyze the cooperative decision by given local representatives on which areas to centralize and which to leave to local governments. Third, we determine who are the representatives chosen in regional elections.
Provision of Public Goods
As mentioned in the introduction, the political aspects of the provision of local public goods have been researched extensively elsewhere. Since our focus is the allocation of decision powers, we find it convenient -in the interest of tractability -to keep the provision decision as simple as possible. We therefore abstract from explicit political considerations with regards to local public goods and assume that their provision is decided optimally, whether this decision is taken at the center or decentrally.
The motivating example is the European Union. While the centralization decision appears highly contested, the actual policy making -in our framework the provision of the local public goods -seems much more routine.
We hence think of these decisions as taken by bureaucrats at the center (the commission in Brussels) or at the regional level who maximize aggregate utility and therefore choose the optimal levels of public goods determined above.
That is, the provision of the local public goods as decided by the central or local authorities is given by equations (2) and (3) respectively. This assumption allows us to concentrate on the centralization decision that is the focus of this paper.
Centralization Decision
Regarding the allocation of decision power, we consider the given regional representatives, α rep i , one from each region. That is, the regional elections have supposedly taken place and the elected representatives now have to decide on the cut-off spill-over level. In other words, they choose what range of local public goods will be decided centrally and which public goods remain under the control of local governments. In making this decision, they are well aware what the resulting provision levels will be, namely the ones we have already determined.
The elected representatives bargain not only about the centralization of decision power but also about the respective contribution of each country towards the financing of the centrally decided public good supply, or equivalently about a potential side payment. One might wonder why each region does not simply pay for its local public goods. However, given the presence of inter-regional externalities and the possibility that representatives of both regions may have different views about the benefits from centralization, our approach seems an important generalization. More formally, the representatives choose the cut-off spill-over level β * and the side-payment Z of region 2 to region 1 in order to maximize the following Nash-product:
where V (β * ; α i ) is the indirect utility to the representatives with preference
in region i if public goods up to (above) the threshold β * are decided locally (centrally). This Nash product can be rewritten in terms of surpluses (as introduced above) in the following way:
The maximization of (5) yields the following results: First, the representatives decide to centralize the decision over the local public good with spill-over β as long as the aggregate surplus from this particular good, ∆(β;
2 ), is non-negative. The politically optimal threshold β * is thus (implicitly) given by:
The second order condition for β * is ∆ β * > 0, which we assume to be satisfied.
It is straightforward to show how the preferences for public spending of the two regional representatives influences the equilibrium cut-off level β * : Using the implicit function theorem, we have dβ * /dα
Since both the denominator and the numerator are positive it follows that dβ * /dα rep i < 0. The higher the preference for public spending of each representative, the lower is the politically chosen β * , in other words, the more decisions are taken at the center. This dependence on α rep reflects the interim nature of our result -we do not yet know who will ultimately represent the districts.
Second, the first-order condition for the politically optimal equilibrium side payment Z * can be written as:
or alternatively, substituting for the surplus functions, as:
where the politically chosen allocation of power, β * = β * (α rep ), is defined by equation (6) above.
The total contributions of both regions towards financing the centrally decided local public good supplies thus amount to:
Substituting equation (3) for the centrally decided level of public goods g c i and equation (7) above for the equilibrium side-payment Z * we obtain:
We see that the contribution a region has to pay increases in the preference of its representative for public goods, α rep i . In the same way it decreases in the preference of the other region's representative, α rep j . The reason is that the greater a representative's desire for public goods, the weaker is her position in the negotiations and consequently the higher the contribution this region ends up paying. Conversely, the weaker the position of her opponent in the negotiations, the less this region has to pay.
Comparing both regions' respective contributions, we see that region one pays more if its representative has the greater desire for public goods, and vice versa. Only, if both representatives have exactly the same preferences for public spending will the contributions be equal. This is the outcome in the symmetric case. It is important to notice, though, that the effects off the symmetric equilibrium are crucial for the voters' decision whom to elect. It is to these decisions that we now turn.
Selection of Representatives
We are now in a position to analyze the first stage of the political process:
In regional elections, voters of each region choose a regional representative.
We assume that they elect citizen-candidates in the sense of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) . In other words, politicians resemble citizens in that they have the same (type-dependent) indirect utility function as ordinary citizens. These indirect utility functions take the form:
which can be rewritten, by substituting for the net benefit function b i , the decentralized public good levels g d =ᾱ, the surplus from centralization s i , and by solving the integrals, as:
When choosing their representative, voters are aware that the equilibrium allocation of decision power β * = β(α rep ) depends on the identities of the representatives. They thus choose their representative α rep i to maxi-
The first order condition of a voter's maximization problem can be written as follows:
Since ε(β * ) > 0 and dβ * /dα rep i < 0, equation (10) can only be satisfied, if
In other words, each voter would like to see a representative whose preference for public spending is lower than the voter's own preference.
As Besley and Coate (2003) we assume that the median voter in each region determines the regional representative. This representative is preferred by a majority of voters compared to a candidate of any other preference type in a pairwise election. The above first order condition then implies that the preference for public spending of both elected representatives in equilibrium is lower than the median's preference for public spending, i.e. α Given that the elected representative is less keen on public spending than the median (α rep i <ᾱ) and that the equilibrium cut-off decreases in the preference parameter of the representative (dβ * /dα rep i < 0), it follows that the politically chosen cut-off level β * (α rep ) falls short of the level β * (ᾱ) that would be chosen by the median voter. Recall that due to our distributional assumption the median and the average voter coincide. The latter cut-off level therefore maximizes the welfare of the average citizen and thus utilitarian welfare. Taking utilitarian welfare as a reference, we conclude that the politically chosen cut-off is sub-optimally low. In other words, strategic delegation leads to less centralization than would be desirable from a utilitarian perspective.
Regarding the equilibrium side payment Z * , it is equal to zero and the contributions of the regions towards the funding of centralized policies are exactly equal. However, this outcome is due to the symmetry of the setup considered so far. We now turn to the case of asymmetric regions.
The Asymmetric Case
In this section we introduce two types of asymmetries between regions: First, we analyze the case of different fixed costs of centralization for both regions.
As we will show, this kind of asymmetry leads to a side-payment Z * which differs from zero but the degree of strategic delegation remains the same in both regions. As a second asymmetry we assume that both regions differ with respect to the spill-overs they receive from the local public good supply of the respective foreign region. These different spill-overs may be interpreted as resulting from differences with respect to the geographic situation in both regions. For example, a region located downstream on a river benefits from pollution reductions in the upstream region whereas the opposite is generally not true. Or a region located on the periphery may receive higher benefits from a road that is built in a central region than vice versa. With this second kind of asymmetry the degree of strategic delegation and thereby the type of the elected representative differs between both regions.
With inter-regional differences in the fixed utility costs of centralization the net surplus of centralization for individual α in region i is s i (β; α; f ) =
Without loss of generality we assume f 2 < f 1 .
As in section 3 we can derive the condition that determines the equilibrium cut-off point β * as
The condition for the side payment Z * (β * ; α rep ; f ) from region 2 to region 1
with β * = β * (α rep ; µ) as determined in (11). To analyze the case of different spill-overs between regions, the net benefit of region i from a public good with spill-over β is written as
To keep the analysis tractable, we only consider the limit case of λ 1 = 0 and we set λ 2 = 1. Public goods supplied by region 1 then cause spill-overs to region 2 whereas region 2 does not produce such externalities. The net benefits for both regions can then be written as
The equilibrium public good levels under decentralization are g As in section 3.2 the degree of centralization and the side payment from region 2 to region 1 are found by maximizing the Nash-product. The equilibrium cut-off point β * is thus given by the condition ∆(β * ; α rep ) = 0 or
The condition for the equilibrium side payment Z * (β
with β * = β * (α rep ) as determined by (13). 
The term β * ε 1 (β * ) − ε 2 (β * )/β * on the right-hand-side of (17) is equal to zero for β * = 1 and strictly increases in β * for β * < 1. Thus, the right-hand-side of (17) exceeds zero for β * < 1. This implies α
With asymmetric regions, the region which benefits from the inter-regional spill-overs elects a representative with a lower preference for public spending than the other region.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a positive theory of centralization. As a first step, we compare how each individual policy is set when the decision is taken decentrally versus when it is taken centrally. As is well known, the centralized solution internalizes spill-overs but may suffer from specific overhead costs of centralization. Our main contribution is to move beyond such a normative analysis and to endogenize the degree of centralization.
In our model, local representatives decide cooperatively on which policy areas are to be centralized and how to share the ensuing costs. We show that strategic delegation leads to less centralist or federal-minded representatives, and as a result the degree of centralization falls short of what is optimal for average citizen. When we modify the setup to account for asymmetric spill-overs between periphery and core; these effects persist, only that the strategic delegation is even more pronounced in the periphery than in the core.
The analysis is styled on the European institutional setup and bears interesting implications for other regional agreements as well. Our findings should reassure all those in Europe who are concerned about the ever ex-panding powers of the Brussels bureaucracy. Quite to the contrary, our model predicts that not enough policies will be centrally decided by the EU.
And it might be exactly the centralization-skeptical politicans, whom the model predicts, who have coined the term subsidiarity. Equally interesting is the implication for core versus periphery countries.
To conclude, let us mention some possible extensions of our research.
One direction is to take a closer look at the actors who set policies both at the center as well as decentrally. We have modelled them as willing, well-meaning executives but clearly they will have their own stakes in the centralization decision and might take action to influence it. It seems that in Europe the national actors are still quite powerful which would tend to reinforce our results, but this could change in a dynamic setting where the balance of power shifts towards Brussels. Another dimension that merits attention is the institutional design aspect of our analysis. An interesting question would be to compare different institutional setups to shed more light on the effects of institutions on centralization. Finally, our treatment of policies has necessarily been stylized, especially on the cost side. The centralization cost we postulated was supposed to proxy for a wide range of possible issues, from informational asymmetries to localization differences.
A more explicit treatment of this aspect could elucidate which policies are bound to be centralized.
